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One of the small joys the election season offers ordinary villagers in Nagaland 
is the inevitable feasts hosted by politicians. In the Chakhesang Naga village I 
shall call Phugwumi, and where I was carrying out research when the 2013 
State Legislative Elections ensued, election feasts became twice-daily events 
from roughly two weeks prior to Polling Day. Meals were partaken in five 
political camps – usually a part of an open compound cordoned off by wood 
and bamboo, set around an open fire, and decorated with party posters and 
flags – presided over by three rivaling politicians who supplied the camp(s) of 
their followers with a steady inflow of rice, vegetables and meat. Of these 
ingredients meat was the one crucial, and some days an entire pig or buffalo 
was walloped towards a camp, then cut, cooked and eaten. Supplied too, albeit 
less openly, was liquor; cans of beer and cheap, and sometimes not so cheap, 
rums and whiskies. Less openly because Nagaland is designated a ‘dry state’, 
the outcome of a persistent lobby by the locally influential Nagaland Baptist 
Church Council (NBCC), which construes the intake of alcohol as an 
abomination before God. Politicians fear being caught contravening law 
and church endowed morality, and therefore entrust the task of distributing 
liquor, which is invariably demanded, to one of their aides. This wining and 
dining was crucial during the election period, and its historical imprints, 
intricacies, and its contested moralities today, the subject of this article. 
• 
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ne of the small joys the election 
season offers ordinary villagers in 
Nagaland is the inevitable feasts 
hosted by politicians. In the Chakhesang Naga 
village I shall call Phugwumi, and where I was 
carrying out research when the 2013 State 
Legislative Elections ensued, election feasts 
became twice-daily events from roughly two 
weeks prior to Polling Day. Meals were 
partaken in five political camps – usually a 
part of an open compound cordoned off by 
wood and bamboo, set around an open fire, 
and decorated with party posters and flags – 
presided over by three rivaling politicians who 
supplied the camp(s) of their followers with a 
steady inflow of rice, vegetables and meat. Of 
these ingredients meat was the one crucial, 
and some days an entire pig or buffalo was 
walloped towards a camp, then cut, cooked 
and eaten. Supplied too, albeit less openly, 
was liquor; cans of beer and cheap, and 
sometimes not so cheap, rums and whiskies. 
Less openly because Nagaland is designated a 
‘dry state’, the outcome of a persistent lobby 
by the locally influential Nagaland Baptist 
Church Council (NBCC), which construes the 
intake of alcohol as an abomination before 
God. Politicians fear being caught 
contravening law and church endowed 
morality, and therefore entrust the task of 
distributing liquor, which is invariably 
demanded, to one of their aides.1 This wining 
and dining was crucial during the election 
period, and its historical imprints, intricacies, 
and its contested moralities today, the subject 
of this article. 
In the run up to the 2013 elections, the 
standard of generous politicians and feasting 
villagers came under heightened scrutiny and 
criticism in Nagaland. The NBCC, in its self-
assigned task to morally and spiritually guide 
the Nagaland populace, launched a state-wide 
Clean Election Campaign, and, among a host 
of other things, sought to impress on local 
electors that accepting food and drinks from 
politicians amounted to being bribed and 
deceived. In a booklet the NBCC published 
and distributed through their many associated 
churches, they asserted: ‘if somebody makes 
any offer of alcohol or other intoxicant or give 
you dinner to vote or not to vote for a 
particular candidate it is bribery and 
punishable’ (NBCC 2012: 10). By reasoning 
thus, the NBCC’s stance only subscribed to 
the ethics, guidelines, and rules set by India’s 
Election Commission, which prohibits 
election feasts for they offer electors undue 
inducements – or even perceive them as 
outright attempt by politicians to procure 
votes – so belying the spirit of free and 
independent judgments on part of India’s 
                                                
1 In local parlance Nagaland is dubbed a Christian 
state as well over 90% of its populace professes 
Christianity and because Christian discourse, 
rituals and symbols often permeate the minute 
texture of everyday life (see Joshi 2012).  
O 
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voters. It is despite this proscription that 
election feasts are reported in places across the 
Subcontinent, and in an effort to waylay the 
Election Commission’s inspecting gaze some 
politicians reportedly try to garb election 
feasts as religious or social functions (see 
Piliavsky 2014: 161-168). For the state of 
Karnataka, for instance, this led the Election 
Commission to remark:  
A doubt has been raised with regard to 
participation of candidates in the 
community kitchen (langar, bhoj, etc.) 
organised by religious communities in 
their religious institutions as a matter of 
customary practice and the bhoj/feast, etc. 
offered as a matter of social practice 
following a ritual ceremony, like marriage, 
death, etc (Indian Election Commission 
2013:26).   
 
The doubt, obviously, was about who paid 
the food bills, or even stood behind organizing 
the event. Piliavsky (2014) noted an 
increasing ingenuity among politicians across 
North-India to organise the election feasts 
their supporters expected – and which the 
politicians themselves saw as the most 
convincing and effective way to promise and 
symbolize the largesse voters sought in their 
political representatives – without attracting 
attention from the Election Commission, and 
risking its wrath. They feasted electors, for 
instance, in events camouflaged as wedding 
ceremonies or birthday parties, but ones 
without any brides, grooms, or birthday boys 
and girls to be found (ibid.: 165-66). In 
comparison, most of Nagaland’s politicians 
ostensibly saw no reason to cover-up their 
election feasts, certainly not in Phugwumi 
where such feasts took place for everybody to 
see, and for every supporter to enjoy.  
When Bayart captivatingly characterized 
democratic politics across Sub-Saharan Africa 
as a ‘politics of the belly’, he qualified that 
this figurative metaphor did not carry any 
normative judgments, but that it was informed 
by a ‘system of historic action whose origins 
must if possible be understood in the 
Braudelian longue durée’ (1993: ix; emphasis 
in original). Pace Bayart, the pages that follow 
seek to illustrate that rather than the moral 
abomination and electoral fraud the NBCC 
and the Election Commission perceive the 
eating and drinking chapters of elections, in 
Nagaland such feasts are also informed by a 
particularistic set of age-old practices and 
principles that socially elevated those capable 
to act as ‘providers’, and in which the 
throwing of feasts near-mechanically 
amplified a feast-giver’s social status, 
standing, and sway – a practice known in 
anthropological annals as the Naga feast of 
merit. Crucially, then and now, I pose, it was 
not just a wealthy and ambitious villager’s 
gesture to host a feast, or indeed feasts, but it 
was morally and socially expected of him to 
do so, as intrinsic to a wider moral economy 
and order of social stratification in which the
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less prosperous could count on the village rich 
to now and then showcase their largesse.2  
In what follows I will start with a 
historical perspective and discuss the 
traditional practice and morals that underlay 
the Naga feast of merit, common to most – 
though not all – Naga tribes, that is until 
Christian missionaries sought and succeeded 
to abolish it. Then we return to the 
ethnographic present as it unfolded in 
Phugwumi and witness how, despite the 
NBCC and the Election Commission ruling 
against them, election feasts became regular 
and lavish displays in the run up to Polling 
Day. Exploring their inner-logic, significances 
and complexities, we will hear from those 
with their bellies stuffed to find out the values, 
reasoning, and meanings they attached to 
being fed during the election period. But we 
will also hear from local criticasters, among 
them mostly those closely engaged with the 
church. But besides church-workers alone, 
some Phugwumi elders are also critical of 
today’s election feasts, albeit for different 
reasons. What they allege, as I will discuss, is 
                                                
2 The term ‘moral economy’ is one heavily loaded 
and my usage of it here builds upon its initial 
theorizing by Thompson (1971) and Scott (1976) 
and their assertion – positioned against 
conventional rational choice and overtly utilitarian 
perspectives – that economic and political action – 
of which throwing feasts is one – is governed by 
patterns of social and moral norms, values and 
expectations that exist within a historically 
situated ‘moral universe.’  
!
that elections feasts are but a flawed imitation 
of erstwhile feasts of merit. To be clear, the 
relationship between traditional feasts of merit 
and contemporary election feasts may not be 
deterministic (we cannot know, for instance, 
whether election feasts would have taken 
place in Nagaland if there had been no 
historical antecedent in lavish feasting), yet I 
do postulate the presence of salient similarities 
in the inner social and moral logic that guide 
and inform both types of feasting. Before 
proceeding, the next section briefly sketches 
the historical and ethnographic context in 
which democratic institutions, ideas, and 
practices unfolded in Nagaland.  
 
The setting  
Nagaland’s experience with modern, 
procedural democracy, Chasie (2001: 247) 
evaluates as ‘complex, difficult and painful.’ 
It was complex because it caught Naga society 
‘in a transition from tradition to modernity’ 
(ibid), difficult because of the ‘disparate 
nature of the [Naga] tribes’, and painful 
because democratic institutions were 
introduced amidst ‘the unresolved Naga 
political issue, with simultaneous 
“insurgency” operating during the entire 
period’ (ibid.). It is the still lingering demand 
for Naga Independence – albeit today often 
framed (and toned down) to an ‘alternative 
arrangement’ of sorts – and the challenge this 
poses to the authority and legitimacy of the 
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local state machinery that admittedly makes 
Nagaland hardly a straightforward place for 
ventures into the substance of India’s 
democratic life.  
It was in its quest for Independence that 
the Naga National Council (NNC), which 
under the Presidency of A.Z. Phizo 
spearheaded the Naga Movement, boycotted 
the country’s general elections of 1952, 1957, 
1962.3 In 1963, after nearly a decade of 
devastating clashes between Naga and Indian 
Armies, Jawaharlal Nehru changed gear and 
carved Nagaland out of Assam, as a state 
within the Indian Union. Although this move 
was rejected by the NNC, which immediately 
condemned as ‘traitors’ and ‘reactionaries’ 
any Naga who pledged allegiance to the new 
state, statehood, and the jobs, schemes and 
subsidies it brought, was hailed by a section of 
Naga leaders who turned themselves into a 
first generation of politicians and bureaucrats. 
The first state elections were conducted in 
1964, after which elections became both 
regular and gradually also participatory (Amer 
2014), even though the NNC and nascent 
                                                
3 According to Lanunungsang Ao (2002: 49): 
‘When the first Indian Parliamentary General 
Election was extended to Nagaland, they [the 
NNC and the Naga more widely] resorted to civil 
disobedience and completely boycotted the 
election on 25, January 1951 [sic]… when the 
second parliamentary election took place in 1957, 
the Naga people once again boycotted the election. 
Not a single Naga candidate fought for election 
nor voted in that election.’  
 
!
Naga nationalist groups continue to condemn 
them as ‘Indian elections imposed on Naga 
soil.’ After multiple dissensions, splits, and 
rivalries within, the Naga cause today is 
primarily represented by contending factions 
of the Nationalist Socialist Council of 
Nagalim (NSCN), which is currently in a 
long-drawn ceasefire with the Central 
Government. But even as negotiations are 
taking place, and have taken place for over 
fifteen years, this has not led to a permanent 
solution, keeping Nagaland’s political 
landscape both multi-layered and volatile.4  
Within Nagaland, my ethnography is 
drawn from the Chakhesang Naga, one of the 
state’s seventeen state-recognized tribes and 
the inhabitants of Phek District to the east of 
Kohima, Nagaland’s state capital. The 
Chakhesang is a new tribe. New in the real 
sense of first seeing daylight in 1946 when 
several village clusters hitherto part of other 
tribes resolved to break-away and fuse into a 
tribe of their own making, to be called 
Chakhesang. Among the Chakhesang Naga, 
Phugwumi constitutes the largest village. Akin 
to many Naga villages, Phugwumi sits 
perched high on a hilltop from where it stands 
guard over its neatly excavated paddy fields
                                                
4!No account on contemporary democracy in 
Nagaland may be considered complete without a 
discussion on what is locally referred to as the 
‘underground factor’, but this will not figure in our 
discussion, and in any case has little bearing on the 
wining and dining elements of Nagaland’s 
elections.!
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below. As Polling Day drew closer electoral 
politics came to dominate most conversations 
and actions of the villagers, most of who 
openly associated themselves with one or 
another candidate.  
State-wise, the Naga Peoples’ Front 
(NPF), which had been the ruling government 
since 2003 after ousting a nearly two decade 
rule by the Congress Party, sought a hat-trick, 
and most opined the Party stood good chances 
of achieving this. However, with besides the 
sitting MLA (NPF Party), also two former 
Ministers and a promising newcomer 
contesting the election fray, Phugwumi’s 
constituency was thought of as an especially 
competitive one, and in the wake of the 
election supporters of all four candidates had 
reasons to believe they were in the driving 
seat.  
The quest for votes was locally often 
ferocious, at times tense, and while voters 
based their decision on whom to give their 
votes on complex and multiple reasons, the 
throwing of continuous feasts for supporters 
was a strategy followed by all four candidates, 
and is the sole focus of the remainder of this 
essay.5 To start discussing this, the next 
                                                
5 For reasons I will not delve into here, one of the 
constituency’s four candidates had been 
proscribed by Phugwumi’s Village Council from 
campaigning within the village, and hence no 
camps and election feasts were organized by him 
or his aides. Two of the four candidates belonged 
to Phugwumi itself.  Both Phugwumi candidates 
section adopts the ethnographic longue durée 
to historically and culturally situate the local 
principles, merits, and moralities of feasting.  
 
The Morals and Merits of Feasting among the 
Naga  
Election feasts, we noted, are hardly unique to 
Nagaland but occur in places across the 
Subcontinent. For Rajasthan, and North-India 
more widely, Piliavsky (2014) evocatively 
traced their practice to age-old patron-client 
relationships and the vintage Jajmani system 
to which they were intrinsic. If in the past 
‘“feeding’ and “eating” – both the act and the 
metaphor – was the crucial link between 
donors and servants’ (2014: 160), a similar 
logic and cultural idiom, Piliavsky writes, 
exists between politicians and voters today: 
the language of feeding is the key moral 
idiom in which people evaluate politicians 
and conceive of the ways in which 
politicians relate, or ought to relate, to 
their constituents… [they title of] feeder 
express the conception of patron as genitor 
and provider, as a source of both 
sustenance and personal substance for his 
clientele (ibid.: 163-164).  
  
But while across North-India the inner-
logic of politics as patronage (see Piliavsky 
2014) may be informed by long-standing 
patron-client relationships, expressed through 
an evocative cultural idiom of feeding and 
eating, and culminating into a set of values 
                                                                          
established two camps, while the sitting MLA 
nourished the remaining one.!!!
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and expectations thence symbolized through 
politicians’ hosting election feasts, no 
traditional patron-client system, or an 
otherwise hierarchical and ritual division of 
labour, ever had much prominence among the 
Naga. And yet, if anything, election feasts in 
Nagaland tend not to be the single-day events 
reported elsewhere, but usually last for days 
and weeks prior to Polling Day.6  Hence if not 
a remnant or remapping of patron-client 
relationships and Jajmani structures and 
sentiments, what, then, might election feasts 
among the Naga be a ‘changing continuity’ 
(Schulte-Nordholt 2005), of? To start 
exploring this, the writings of Von Fürer-
Haimendorf, the first trained anthropologist to 
study the Naga through prolonged participant 
observation, appear to provide us with an 
important clue.  
Researching the Naga in the 1930s, Fürer-
Haimendorf witnessed ‘hundreds and 
thousands of megalithic monuments’ with 
each of them erected to commemorate the 
‘fame and generosity’ of a particular feast-
giver (1976[1939]: 19) in whose name the 
megalith had been erected. On further inquiry, 
he found that, among the Naga, one’s social 
status an standing did not rely on the 
                                                
6!It might be qualified that, among certain Naga 
tribes, certain clans were traditionally associated 
with specific ritual functions. However, such ritual 
acts were first and foremost symbolic and 
performed sporadically, and not part of an 
elaborate ritual division of everyday labour.!!!
accumulation of wealth, but that social 
ascendance could be achieved through a 
person dispensing his wealth by throwing 
lavish feast, an elaborate social institution 
popularized as a feast of merit. Haimendorf 
had hardly been the first visitor to the (then) 
Naga Hills to notice this local custom and the 
moral and social principles it relied on. Half a 
century earlier, Colonel Woodthorpe, 
travelling far and wide in the area, put to 
paper his sheer astonishment about the long 
rows of monoliths he observed in villages 
across the Naga Hills. He commented: ‘[these 
monoliths] are either monumental or simply 
commemorative of some big feast given by a 
rich man.’ He also noticed how a great deal of 
effort and sweat went into pulling and erecting 
such stones:   
These stones are often of great size, and 
are dragged up into place on wooden 
sledges shaped like the prow of a boat, the 
keel curving upwards. On this sledge the 
stone is levered, and carefully lashed with 
canes and creepers, and to this the men, 
sometimes to the number of several 
hundreds, attached themselves in a long 
line, and putting rollers beneath the sledge, 
they pull it along until it has been brought 
to the spot where the stone is to be 
erected’ (Woodthorpe 1881: 53-4).   
 
The monolith, once erected, came, in a 
way, to inhabit the virtues and achievements 
of the feast-giver in whose honour it was 
erected, and continues to enshrine them today. 
While joining Athe [a Chokri classificatory 
term for grandfather] for village walks, as I
www.southasianist.ed.ac.uk     |   ISSN 2050-487X  |  pg. 13 
did often, I noticed how he was able to relate 
virtually each of Phugwumi’s many monoliths 
to a particular feast-giver, even if the feasts 
had taken place several generations ago. For 
an aspirant villager to climb the social ladder, 
to expand his sway and have his voice heard 
more loudly, a single feast would hardly do 
the trick. In the course of his life an ambitious 
person was expected to provide a series of 
feasts (locally called zhotho muza). Such 
feasts were ritually sanctioned with each of 
them allowing the feast-giver a further display 
that denoted his social ascendancy. In 
Phugwumi, the symbolic index of social 
stratification would start with a feast-giver’s 
right to wear a specifically embroidered 
shawl, followed by the permission to decorate 
his house with X-shaped boards and carvings, 
to ultimately large monoliths being erected in 
his name. Put differently, by performing the 
feast of merit the feast-giver in a way 
absolved material wealth, but accumulated 
material symbols. As a social institution, the 
feast of merit therefore is both an equalizing 
force in economic terms, and one fostering a 
certain social hierarchy.  
On a tour through the Eastern Angami 
area, now Chakhesang, Fürer-Haimendorf 
stumbled onto a large open compound with 
houses on two sides:  
Cross barge-boards rose from the gables of 
one of the houses, like the enormous 
antlers of some proud stag. Proud, too, 
must have been the owner of these wooden 
horns, for they showed that he had given 
several of those expensive Feasts of Merits 
whereby the Naga rises in social prestige 
and in the esteem of his neighbours’ (1976 
[1939]: 9).  
 
In Phugwumi, a complete series would 
involve nine feasts, after which a row of nine 
monoliths would have been erected in the 
feast-giver’s name, a life-long exercise that 
involved such grandiose expenses that only 
three villagers are remembered to have ever 
accomplished this. In fact, most villagers 
would never find themselves in the position to 
throw a single feast, and instead relied on the 
village wealthy to, now and then, enable them 
to lavish on meat and rice-beer. Fürer-
Haimendorf explained:  
The wealth of the ambitious was employed 
to provide food and enjoyment for the less 
prosperous members of the community, 
for at a Feast of Merit there was meat, rice 
and rice-beer for every man, woman and 
child in the village” (1976 [1939]: 47).   
 
While few villagers were able, everyone 
aspired to be a feast-giver, and this ambition, 
the colonial officer J.P. Mills wrote, had a 
stimulating impact on local agriculture. It is 
worth quoting him at some length:  
the essence of this system [Feast of Merit] 
is that every male Naga, if he is to acquire 
merit and status in this world and the next, 
must give a series of feasts, every detail of 
which is strictly prescribed… they begin 
with the sacrifice of a pig and end with 
that of at least one domestic bison 
garnished, so to speak, with quantities of 
cattle and pigs. An immense amount of 
rice and rice beer is consumed, and more 
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rice than money goes to the buying of the 
animals. The Feasts therefore directly 
simulate agriculture. More important sill 
are the privileges they win for the giver. 
At stated stages in the series he and his 
wife gain the right to wear special cloths, 
which increase in splendour and in the 
elaborateness of their embroidery the 
further he advances. He is also entitled to 
embellish his house with carved posts and 
beams. It is important to remember that, 
no matter how rich a man may be, he can 
win the rights to these cloths and carvings 
only by giving feasts’ (1935: 134).   
 
Seen as a historical social institution, the 
feast of merit thus seemingly invoked 
contradictory principles, combining 
tendencies of economic redistribution and 
social differentiation, of both socialism and 
snobbery, but crucially it vested social 
eminence in a person’s ability to act as a 
provider, not, say, in mere accruing. 
Unfortunately, the feast of merit was 
among the first sacrifices mostly American 
and Welsh missionaries demanded from new 
Naga converts, interpreting them as an 
ostentatious wastage of wealth and its free-
flowing rice-beer as inducing immoralities of 
sorts. Its gradual abolishment had wide 
ramifications: the same J.P. Mills commented:  
‘a great number of very fine embroidery 
patterns and carvings designs owe their 
existence entirely to this system of Feast of 
Merit and will continue to exist only as long 
as the system does’ (1935: 134), then 
lamenting: ‘one has only to stroll through a 
Christian village. There may be many rich 
men with granaries bursting with rice, but not 
a fine cloth or carving you will see’ (ibid.). 
If Mills lamented the missionaries’ 
abolishment in terms of the fine clothes and 
carvings no longer embroidered and engraved, 
for ordinary villagers it also punctured a core 
aspect of a moral economy that benefitted and 
entertained them. In Phugwumi some village 
elders still vividly recall, and sometimes feel 
nostalgic to, the feasts of merit they witnessed 
in their youth. A number of houses continue to 
flaunt the meticulously carved wooden walls 
and cross barge boards distinctive of the house 
of a feast-giver, but these decorations are of 
no recent manufacture. After the majority of 
villagers took to the new religion from the late 
1950s onward, feasts of merit saw a steep 
decline in Phugwumi, then died out 
completely.7 Except perhaps, somewhat 
paradoxically, on Christmas Day when a 
Christianised version – that is a feast of merit 
without rice-beer – is invariably organised for 
the congregation by a wealthy villager, usually 
a politician, contractor, or a high-ranking 
government officer, and who, in return for his 
generosity, is offered a shawl, and is 
collectively prayed for during the church 
service. 
                                                
7 Compared to surrounding villages Christianity 
came late to Phugwumi. The first villager 
converted in 1947 but it was to take several years 
before Christianity became the dominant, and later 
only, religion in the village.  
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But even if now abolished, as a traditional 
social institution the feast of merit provides a 
valuable window into values, norms and 
expectations that informed social 
differentiations, a moral economy, as well as 
local notions that surrounded village 
leadership. To emphasize, the decision to 
throw a feast was hardly optional on part of 
the rich and ruling, but morally expected of 
them. Summing up the pre-state qualities 
expected of village rulers among the pre-state 
Naga, Hokishe Sema, a former Nagaland 
Chief-Minister, reflected in his memoirs:  
These [village] rulers have some person 
distinction acquired by them through their 
performances of sacrifices and good 
judgments. They also have a great 
economic power and their capacity to help 
the poor and the needy in the village is 
greatly appreciated. They provide food, 
shelter, and clothing for the needy in an 
emergency. It is a great shame for the rulers 
if their subjects go to other villages for 
food. It is the duty of these rulers to ensure 
the security and welfare of their subjects 
(1986: 168).  
  
While in Phugwumi there existed no 
mechanical linkage between becoming a feast-
giver and becoming a village leader as, then 
and now, the wealth and wisdom needed to 
guide the villagers are known to be two 
different domains altogether, while village 
elders were invariably ascribed more wisdom 
than others. However, village leaders were 
often, though not always, also known as feast-
givers, and, in any case, were expected to be 
capable to act as providers and guarantors, as 
Hokishe Sema’s quote well captures.8 The 
next sections attempts to show that it is in this 
traditional feast-of merit, the practices, 
principles, and morals that lied beneath them, 
that the inner-logic of today’s election feasts is 
vested, even though, as will become clear, 
such feasts are no straightforward remapping 
of the feast of merit and today draw 
contentious judgments.  
 
The Conflicting moralities of Election Feasts  
The first episode of food entering the election 
domain in Phugwumi was about five months 
prior to Election Day when a pair of trucks 
pulled into the village. Both were stacked with 
fifty-kilogram bags of rice, one for each 
Phugwumi household. The rice had been 
arranged and paid for by an aspiring 
politician. ‘In compensation for the year’s bad 
harvest’, the generous politician had explained 
                                                
8!The Naga traditional polity, it must be stressed, 
was far from heterogeneous. Digging through the 
Naga archive we find accounts about chiefs and 
democrats (Jacobs et al 1990), nobles and 
commoners (Fürer-Haimendorf 1973), village 
councillors (Mills 1926), clan elders (Mills 1922), 
powerful chiefs (Fürer Haimendorf 1939; Hutton 
1921b), and the conspicuous absence of chiefs 
(Hutton 1921a). Elsewhere I proposed how the 
structure and ethos of past polities can be linked to 
present-day voting behaviour among the Naga by 
distinguishing four electoral models (Angh or 
Kingship model, village consensus candidate 
model, clan model, and household model), the 
presence of which indicates ‘how different Naga 
tribes, instead of adjusting themselves to modern 
democratic ideals, adjusted democracy to 
themselves’ (Wouters 2014: 59).   
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as his aides went about distributing the heavy 
bags. ‘An electoral strategy’, most in the 
village understood.  
But sacks of uncooked paddy is hardly the 
kind of feeding associated with election feasts, 
which started in fullness in the weeks and 
days preceding Polling Day. Three out of the 
four candidates opened camps in the village 
(with two of them maintaining two each – a 
general and a youth camp). It was in these 
camps that supporters came together and 
discussed the latest political developments, 
digested facts and rumours, devised new 
strategies, but most of all to eat lunches and 
dinners, and to enjoy a good time with friends 
and neighbours. The food prepared was 
always lavish, and never without meat, which 
for most in the village remained too scarce for 
everyday use in ordinary times. Such 
excessive feasting was also part and parcel to 
elections in the Naga inhabited hills of 
adjacent Manipur, and in the run up to the 
2012 Manipur state elections a piece in a local 
daily read:  
Election fever has gripped the hill district 
of Manipur in spite of the social impasse 
triggered by several issues with the latest 
being the new district creation demand 
boom. However, these issues are not the 
common worry for the intending 
candidates. With speculations doing the 
round that assembly election in Manipur is 
likely to be held in five months’ time, 
election related programmes are underway. 
However, most of the intending candidates 
are finding it hard to satiate their followers 
when [it] comes to feasting. Feasting is the 
all-time favourite of all the election-related 
occasions in the hill districts… With pork 
being the all-time favourite, the difficulty 
in finding pigs has become a great 
headache for the tribal politicians… 
Knowing the situation, butchers and those 
farmers are set to do brisk business. A 
matured pig costs now anything between 
Rs 25.000 to 30.000 in most parts of hill 
districts’ (Newmai News Network 08-09-
2012) 
 
Securing sufficient meat posed an 
organisational challenge to politicians in and 
around Phugwumi, and it was still many 
months before the elections that rumours 
spread conveying that a certain politician had 
approached ‘this or that person’ with the 
request to fatten his pig(s) with the promise to 
procure its meat during the election period. To 
satisfy demand, politicians also imported meat 
from neighbouring Assam, but electors 
invariably preferred meat from animals locally 
reared, and a politician supplying ‘Assam 
meat’ ran the risk of causing both grouchy 
bellies and tongues.  
Akin to the past feast of merit, this element 
of provisioning on part of politicians was not 
just a voluntary gesture. To the contrary, 
electors expected to be fed during the election 
season. Throwing feasts was seen as a 
candidate’s moral obligation, as a bondage 
that came with his ambitions and aspirations 
to find acceptance as a leader (and shame on 
those aspirant leaders stingy in their 
supplies!). Most ‘eaters’ in Phugwumi 
testified to this logic; ‘he wants to be our
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leader, so he must feast us’, or simply ‘it is his 
duty to feed us’ Some others, especially 
youths, appeared to reason less in traditional 
but more in transactional terms: ‘I am helping 
in his campaign, he must feed me.’ But if the 
moral obligation on part of leaders to feed, 
and the expectation of ordinary villagers to be 
feasted, shows clear parallels to practices and 
principles of past feasts of merit, today’s 
election feasts have also become sites of 
conflicting judgments and moralities, to which 
we will now turn.  
If election feasts were morally denunciated 
and configured as distorted electoral practice 
by the NBCC and the Election Commission, 
in Phugwumi there was a clear moral 
reasoning to such feasts. We already saw how 
‘eaters’ relied on a pre-existing moral 
framework, derived from the traditional feasts 
of merit and perennial notions of good 
leadership, to explain and justify their eating 
at the behest of an aspiring leader, but little 
could draw as vicious moral disapproval than 
witnessing the same person allowing himself 
to be feasted in camps belonging to rivalling 
candidates. In fact, no self-respecting villager 
would fill his stomach from two camps. 
Paradoxically, it is in such restrictions that we 
might find a deeper moral critique. This is so 
because in a traditional feast of merit all 
villagers would eat, irrespective of the 
rivalries and divisions that existed within the 
village – in fact, not showing up for a feast 
could draw instant moral disapproval. 
Elections feasts, in contrast, do not exhibit 
such a sense of community and inclusiveness 
as they are meant for political followers only, 
and it is this exclusivity in feasting which, 
some Phugwumi elders tell, only exemplifies 
the disunity and discord electoral politics has 
brought to the village.  
There were other controversies and 
convulsions. Election feasts are excessively 
lavish and certainly a great deal lengthier 
compared to the nine feasts that closed the 
traditional cycle of feasts of merit, which 
moreover an ambitious feast-giver would take 
his entire life-time to arrange, and even then 
often hardly managed more than a few. Such 
excessive feasting is in parts, I pose, because 
the wealth politicians are thought to accrue 
during their tenures has become locally 
thought of excessive too, and feasts continue 
to serve as a method and expectation for its 
dispensing, or at least so for those seeking to 
enter the political realm. A prime (and related) 
critique is the ambiguous source of today’s 
wealth. If past feasts of merit were thrown as 
the result of a feast-giver’s many years of toil 
and sweat exerted in cultivating his fields, 
election feasts today are thought to be 
(indirectly) financed by state monies, thus not 
out of his ‘real’ and hard labour (most 
villagers assert that only cultivating fields 
amounts to ‘real labour’, as opposed to those 
who ‘sit’ in government offices). This 
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difference is crucial, and the notion that 
election feasts are (indirectly) paid by state 
monies, rather than through personal drudgery 
– while not changing villagers’ expectations to 
be feasted by their leaders – metaphorically 
changes the taste of the meat, and reduces the 
veneration and esteem bestowed on today’s 
feast-givers.  
There also exists a growing realisation that 
politicians, once elected in office, waste little 
time on reimbursing themselves on past 
expenses, plus the additional expenses needed 
for the throwing of feasts during the next 
election.9 ‘The more we eat now’, as one 
Phugwumi villager explained, ‘the more he 
[the politician] will eat later.’10 Such a 
sequence goes against the grain of the moral 
economy that stirred feasts of merit, which 
although created social differentiation, 
simultaneously worked as an economic 
equalizer, while, back then, it would take a 
feast giver many years and hard labour to 
regain his previous position of wealth (only to 
be expected to feast it away again). Electors 
understand this, and if Nagaland politicians 
                                                
9 Pointing to the money play during Nagaland 
Elections, Ezung (2012: 2) writes: ‘A person who 
is elected through the use of money will always try 
to cover up the expenses he/she made during the 
election and will also try to retain some extra 
money for the next election.’ See also Nuh (1986), 
Dev (1988), Misra (1987; 2000), and Kiewhuo 
(2002). 
10 The politician ‘eating’, in local idiom, referred 
to him trying to recover his electoral expenses and 
more by appropriating state resources 
have been accused of abusing democracy to 
‘an industry to earn through malpractice’ 
(Kiewhuo 2002: 61), during election seasons 
‘campaign inducements [of which feasts make 
only one dimension] becomes a sort of 
industry’ (Amer 2014: 4).11 Voters can 
however be as cunning as their politicians, and 
in the run up to Polling Day the youth 
president of one of the candidates, and whose 
duties included presiding over, and supplying, 
the youth camp, complained about the 
countless troubles and demands he had to face 
on a daily basis.  
‘This is the biggest headache to manage’, 
he pointed to a half-empty bottle of whiskey 
that stood between us and then refilled mine 
and his glass: 
They [the party youth] demand to be given 
drinks every night. First we gave them 
simple rums and whiskies [the cheapest 
locally available] but now with Polling Day 
coming closer they insist on beer [which is 
more expensive locally]. If we don’t give 
them what they want, they will become 
very different to control. They might even 
shift camps [join another political party]. 
All the time I need to call my boss [the 
politician] to ask for more money to be able 
to satisfy them.12
                                                
11 Such campaign inducements hardly only 
concern election feasts, but involved a wider 
assortment of inducements, including monetary 
ones.  
12 Of course, the very occurrence of such explicit 
demands is another subversion of past feasts of 
merits, in which the act of ‘providing’ was seen as 
self-evident, to be offered by a wealthy villager, 
not demanded by ordinary villagers.  
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While rice-beer had long been part of the 
local diet, and crucial to a successful feast of 
merit, missionaries had ferociously preached 
against its intake, and it is therefore perhaps 
not surprising that it is the free flow of liquor 
during election periods that especially worried 
today’s church leaders. It was the very 
abolishment of political camps, in which 
liquor was often partaken, that was preached 
by the NBCC, which qualified those camps as 
‘breeding grounds of all kinds of malpractices 
such as [the] use of alcohol, drugs, gambling, 
sexual immoralities, violence… [and other] 
unfavourable and abominable activities before 
God’ (NBCC 2012: 6-7).  
Responding to the NBCC’s call, some 
‘godly’ Village Councils in Nagaland 
prohibited politicians to wine and dine 
electors, and notified their decision in local 
dailies, for instance: ‘Public Information: the 
Diphupar Village Council… has unanimously 
resolved to ban [the] opening of mess for all 
political parties’ (cited in Morung Expres 18-
2-2013).  
Phugwumi’s village pastor, too, thought 
little good came from political camps and 
election feasts, but the Village Council 
Chairperson saw no possibility to restrict these 
practices – ‘we can’t stop it. It has become 
part of every election’, he explained. He 
himself however avoided to be seen near any 
political camp, and so did Phugwumi’s 
church-workers and others who rated NBCC’s 
divinely-inspired guidelines above he earthly 
pleasures of eating and drinking.13  
While the pulpit was the NBCC’s chosen 
platform to counter the wining and dining 
dimensions of elections, some local (church) 
organisations went further, and in the wake of 
Polling Day a local daily reported how in 
Phek District: 
several surveillance groups have been 
formed and check posts are set up in almost 
all villages spearheaded by the CPO 
[Chakhesang Public Organisation] and 
CBCC [Chakhesang Baptist Church 
Council]… the frisking of vehicles started 
from February 9 [Polling Day was 
scheduled for the 23th that month] and so 
far 1021 bottles of various brands have 
been seized and were destroyed in the 
presence of the administration and the 
police (cited in Morung Express 13-02-
2013).  
 
A handful of those 1021 seized bottles 
came from the trunk of the vehicle I happened 
to be traveling in to witness a political rally in 
the nearby administrative town, to which I had 
been invited that morning by the party-worker 
who sat behind the wheel. Nearing the town, 
our vehicle had been stopped by volunteers of 
the Women Wing of the Chakhesang Baptist 
Church Council (CBCC) who duly frisked the 
vehicle. Little did I know of the whiskies 
present in the trunk, which were solemnly 
                                                
13!The NBCC election guidelines included a great 
deal more than a prohibition on feasting and the 
intake of liquor. Among others they warned 
against vote-buying, proxy-voting, double entries 
in the electoral role, and the use of intimidation 
and undue pressure to win votes.!!
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confiscated and subsequently stalled out on 
the road-side as a display of the party-workers 
‘immorality.’ As we drove on, the party-
worker grumbled about his loss. ‘The Church 
should confine itself to praying and feasting 
for the election, not checking vehicles.’  
To recapture: what was taking place in 
Phugwumi, and in places across Nagaland, 
was not a simple exchange of meals and liquor 
for votes, the obtaining of which required a 
politician a great deal more effort. Instead, 
providing meaty feasts and liquor answered 
time-honoured local practices and principles, 
informed by a moral economy in which the 
village rich and ruling were expected to be 
generous. And yet, if the practices and 
principles surrounding election feasts show 
multiple parallels with past feasts of merit, its 
practice today simultaneously diverges from it 
in crucial aspects, as this section too has 
sought to illustrate, and which shroud present-
day electoral feasts in an aura of moral 
ambivalence. This critique, with at its core 
that election feasts do not showcase the 
inclusiveness and sense of community central 
to feast of merits, as well as the morally 
ambiguous origins of the monies used to 
finance them, remains however of a different 
nature from the critique levied by the NBCC 
and the Election Commission, whose 
disposition remains short and simple: ‘No 
feasts!’   
 
Conclusion 
If the NBCC and India’s Election Commission 
look upon election feasts as distorted and 
dissolute electoral practice unbecoming of 
India’s deepening (Heller 2009) and 
flourishing democracy (Guha 2009; Khilnani 
2007), when evaluated in the ethnographic 
longue durée election feasts among the Naga 
acquire a significance of their own. Rather 
than undue attempts to woo and buy votes, to 
most in Phugwumi the principle of 
provisioning – in the very literal sense of 
being occasionally wined and dined – has 
always been integral to their understandings of 
social differentiation and leadership, to the 
extent that a leader unable to feed others was 
often no leader at all.  
While it must be emphasized that, 
certainly in Phugwumi, there existed no 
mechanical linkage between a feast-giver and 
a village leader given that seniority and 
wisdom were evaluated in their own right, the 
jump from a position of social pre-eminence 
achieved through the throwing of feasts to one 
of political sway and prominence was 
invariably easier to accomplish compared to 
an ambitious villager without the track-record 
of a feast-giver. It is akin to traditional feasts 
of merit that during today’s election feasts 
both feeders and eaters gain, the former in 
uplifting their local standing, which certainly 
helps their election bid, and the latter in being 
able to lavish on meat otherwise scarce, and
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for some to drink the liquor they otherwise 
find hard to obtain or afford. Emphasizing the 
similarities in inner logic, moral values, and 
past practices that underlie both feasts of merit 
and election feasts, however, is far from 
arguing that election feasts are a direct and 
uncomplicated recasting of feasts of merit. If 
anything, as some Phugwumi elders insist, 
contemporary election feasts – the way they 
are funded and their exclusivist character – are 
but a flawed imitation of past feasts of merit.  
As noted, election feasts are reported not 
only in Nagaland but in places across the 
Indian polity. It would however be wrong to 
assert that such feasts rely everywhere on a 
same inner-logic and cultural idiom, and if 
they have been linked to a resurgence of 
patron-client relationships, and a cultural 
idiom derived from Jajmani systems of sorts 
in Rajasthan and Northern India more widely 
(Piliavsky 2014), it is in the absence of such 
pre-existing social patterns that election feasts 
in Nagaland are not just held, but perhaps well 
outdo those in most other parts of the 
Subcontinent.  
On a final note; Nagaland’s spectrum of 
political parties has been criticized for its 
staunchly ‘non-ideological character’ (Amer 
2014: 6), evidence of which commentators 
find in the frequent cross-carpeting and party 
hopping on part of politicians. While 
Nagaland’s electoral politics is indeed not a 
politics of manifestos, party visions, and 
public platforms,14 this might not justify 
characterizing the substance of Nagaland’s 
democracy as non-ideological. If anything, the 
cultural transitivity of the concept of party and 
political ideology is complex, and, among the 
Naga, as this article has shown, a great deal of 
ideology was in fact vested in an aspirant 
politician’s ability to throw lavish feasts. 
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14!Although these do play a role, especially when it 
comes to the tension between regional and 
national political parties, these often remain of 
little help to understand local voting behaviour.!!
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